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I. INTRODUCTION

The year 2002 may be remembered in the annals of the law as
the year that corporate America became accountable for its actions.
The boardroom, equated with the smoke-filled room of corrupt
enterprise and political machination, came under fire as industry
giants sank amidst charges of misconduct. In response to high profile
allegations of corporate fraud, Congress commenced a fervent
bipartisan effort to draft and implement a law to counter corporate
obstruction of justice.1 On July 1, 2002, President George W. Bush
signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 2 The bill included a section that
prescribes strong penalties for individuals who corruptly impede an
official investigation. 3 More specifically, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c), passed as
part of Sarbanes-Oxley, provides that:

1.
See Democrats to Introduce Enron-Related Bills, CNN.com (Feb. 6, 2002), (mapping
congressional efforts to implement white collar crime reform), at http://www.cnn.com/20O2/US/
02/06/enronlindex.html.
2.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and
18 U.S.C.).
3.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(c) (West Supp. 2004).
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Whoever corruptly-(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document,
other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity
availability for use in an official proceeding; or (2) otherwise obstructs, influences,
impedes any official proceeding, or attempts4 to do so, shall be fined under this title
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

1431
or
or
or
or

Since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, prosecution for
obstruction of justice has gained prominence as a means of criminally
sanctioning individuals suspected of involvement in other substantive
misconduct. 5 Subsequently, it appears that the obstruction charges
have been levied as a type of proxy for substantive offenses, partially
as a means to strengthen the prosecutor's hand during the inquiry
6
stage of white-collar investigations.
Close examination of the Act indicates congressional intent to
significantly increase the criminal penalty for unscrupulous acts in
the business setting. 7 Indeed, the Act was ascribed greater weight in
Congress than a routine overhaul of criminal sanctions: its discussion
was couched in crisis terms and its passage was deemed critical to
both the efficient operation of capital markets and the restoration of
faith in the American free enterprise system.8 Not only politicians
4.
Id. (emphasis added).
5.
See, e.g., Press Release No. 02-627, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Enron Chief Financial
Officer Andrew S. Fastow Indicted For Fraud, Money Laundering, Conspiracy (Oct. 31, 2002)
("On June 15, 2002, a federal jury in Houston convicted accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLP of
obstruction of justice for destroying documents to keep them from the SEC .... In addition,
former Arthur Andersen auditor David Duncan pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice in
connection with his role in the destruction of Enron-related documents.'), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/October/02-crm-627.htm; Press Release No. 02-356, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Statement of Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson on the Arthur Andersen
Verdict (June 15, 2002) ('This guilty verdict shows that the evidence conclusively
demonstrated.., that Andersen intentionally interfered with an official investigation concerning
Andersen's client Enron Corporation when it destroyed tons of papers documents and a large
quantity of electronic information." (emphasis added)), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2002IJune/02_dag_356.htm.
6.
See Riva D. Atlas, Mutual Fund Ex.executive Is Sentenced to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 2003, at C1.
7.
See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1102, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512 (West 2000 & Supp.
2004) (prescribing new penalties for obstruction of justice); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1106,
15 U.S.C. § 78ff (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 108-219) (increasing five-fold criminal
money penalties for violation of certain provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); " ... ":
: see also 148 CONG. REC. H5462 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statements in support of the
Conference Report on H3673, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). "[W]e must crack down on the
corporate criminals and rebuild America's confidence in our markets .... [T]he best way to do
that is to punish the corporate wrongdoers and to punish them harshly." 148 CONG. REC. H5464
(daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Representative Sensenbrenner).
8.
[This Act] responds in a measured way to the very real crisis of confidence among
America's... investors .... Make no mistake, this is a difficult period for those who love and
cherish the free enterprise system. Since early 2000, our capital markets, although still the most
respected in the world, have unquestionably suffered a series of blows-mostly self-inflictedwhich [sic] have truly damaged the public's faith in the integrity of corporate America ....
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stood up and took notice. A television commercial for Heineken beer,
broadcast during the 2002 holiday season, vilified document
destruction as being anathema to having been "good this year."9
President Bush reiterated the important social interests behind
subsection 1512(c), stating that the purpose of the Act was to "adopt
tough new provisions to deter and punish corporate and accounting
fraud and corruption, ensure justice for wrongdoers, and protect the
interests of workers and shareholders." 10 While the intent behind this
portion of the Act appears manifestly clear, issues of construction give
rise to ambiguous interpretation that may lead to inconsistent
application. Perhaps recognizing this potential, the President
attempted to provide some interpretive guidance, stating that
Several provisions of the Act require careful construction by the executive branch as it
faithfully executes the Act .... To ensure that no infringement on the constitutional
right to petition the Government for redress of grievances occurs in the enforcement of
section 1512(c) of title 18 of the U.S. Code ... which among other things prohibits
corruptly influencing any official proceeding, the executive branch shall construe the
term "corruptly"in section 1512(c)(2) as requiringproof of a criminal state of mind on
11
the part of the defendant."

Still, this guidance fails to articulate the degree of criminal
state of mind that "corruptly" implies. Over the last two decades,
courts and commentators have debated the meaning of the term
"corrupt" in Chapter 73 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the
obstruction of justice statutes. 12 Not surprisingly, no court has yet

Investors will now get better information and will get it faster and they will have more faith in
the numbers .... I have advocated a free market approach to regulation, but I also believe that
capitalism can only flourish under the rule of law. Those views are not at odds. In fact, they are
quite consistent. Government must be careful not to overreach and stifle the entrepreneurial
spirit that has made the United States the most successful economy in the history of the world.
At the same time, government has a responsibility to punish-and [sic] do so swiftly and
severely-those [sic] who seek to cheat and steal from others. [Trish: This is a block quote.]
148 CONG. REC. H5462 (daily ed., July 25, 2002) (statement of Senator Oxley).
9.
The television commercial began with a view of a lively holiday party from a perspective
outside an apartment building, with what appeared to be snow falling outside. Office Party
(Heineken television commercial, 2002).
Panning up the apartment building, it becomes
apparent to the viewer that the "snow" is in fact something akin to confetti being thrown from
the top floor window. Id. The camera view then cuts to inside that top floor apartment, where a
number of harried looking men dressed in white-collar attire are busily shredding papers and
tossing them out into the winter night. Id. The commercial ends with a statement wishing a
happy holiday season to all those who had been good in the past year. Id. : :.
10. Statement by President George W. Bush upon Signing H.R. 3763 (July 30, 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730.10.html.
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. For an overview of some of these debates, see infra Parts II.A., II.B. Chapter 73 of Title
18 of the United States Code is titled "Obstruction of Justice" and comprises 18 U.S.C. §§ 150121. Throughout this Note, I will use the phrase "obstruction of justice statute(s)" or "Chapter 73
to refer to these sections.
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had occasion to address its meaning in the context of the relatively
new subsection 1512(c).
Although subsection 1512(c) is simply one provision of an
omnibus act, it arguably has the potential to be regarded as the most
expansive legislative revision of the obstruction of justice statutes in
the history of the statutory scheme. Defining the parameters of this
subsection will significantly impact prosecutors' ability to prove
liability, courts' ability to assess a penalty, and the ability of
individuals and businesses to avoid obstruction of justice charges.
Part II of this Note draws on history, caselaw, extrinsic, and
etymological sources to delineate the foundations of corruption as a
scienter element. Part III discusses the judicial interpretation of
"corruptly" and further addresses the impediments in the current
scheme that could inhibit its proper application. Part IV analyzes the
impact of subsection 1512(c) on certain business practices, discussing
the unique characteristics of legitimate business practice and
corresponding government enforcement strategies as well as the
controlling effect of social norms, to highlight discrete dangers that
are present in its current textual form. Part V proposes revising
subsection 1512(c) based on enforcement provisions contained in
certain criminal and banking codes. Alternatively, that Part explores
whether, in the context of subsection 1512(c), courts should abandon
their lenient interpretation of "corruptly" as a scienter element and
instead impose a novel three-part, super-intent requirement. This
construction would best comport with the placement of subsection
1512(c) within its statutory scheme. Moreover, a clear definition or
construction of the scienter element is necessary to allow individual
actors inside the business world to implement effective planning and
internal anti-corruption strategies. Finally, defining the scienter
requirement would increase the efficiency and equity of investigations
into business misconduct.
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF "CORRUPT" UNDER THE
FEDERAL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE PROVISIONS

A. History, Construction, and Interpretationof Federal Obstructionof
Justice Statutes
states

The struggle to assign culpability for corrupt acts and mental
that obstruct justice stretches far through American
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jurisprudential history. 13 The word corrupt has ancient roots. From
antiquity to the modern day, it is clear that the term could hinge on
either an act itself or on an subjective, pejorative, moral judgment of
some underlying motivation. 14 Traditionally, however, corruption
implied both an act and a corresponding mental state. 15 In discussing
what corruptly implies in the newly minted §1512(c), it is necessary to
examine its history, both alone and in reference to the obstruction of
justice statutory scheme. Unfortunately, examination of the historical
treatment of related obstruction of justice statutes that use corrupt as
a scienter element may only prove to confuse construction of the newly
added section.
Obstruction of justice as both a concept and a legal term of art
has adorned the halls of Anglo-American justice in the context of
professional misconduct for over four centuries. 16 In analyzing a case
involving "practices obstructive or harmful to the administration of
justice," Justice Cardozo considered the early instances of the
attachment of culpability for such behavior. 17 This history also
underscores the importance of documentation in the judicial process
dating to the 16th Century.' 8 At that time, the appearance of judicial
propriety, equity, and fairness was the underlying rationale behind
the charge. 19 While official sanctions were appropriate in particularly
egregious instances, the normative pressure of the expectation of a
barrister's peers was usually sufficient to keep him within the bounds
20
of accepted practice.
The charge of obstruction of justice was carried into the
Americas and retained its strongly negative normative overtone. 2' The
13.

See infra notes 21-38 and accompanying text.

14.

See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 5, sc. 4,

Lines 46-48 : ("But you, that are polluted with your lusts,/ Stain'd with the guiltless blood of
innocents,/ Corrupt and tainted with a thousand vices ....
").
15.

See WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY (1828).

16. See People ex. rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489-92 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)
(tracing, with derision, the history of barristers and attorneys who have been charged with
obstruction of justice back to the seventeenth century and making comparisons to
contemporaneous prosecutions: 'Those guilty of falsities were the ambulance chasers of the
day.").
17. Id. at 490-91.
18. Id. at 491 (discussing the charge of misprisio clerici: the submission of writs without the
required formalities).
19. "Our court is 'slandered and evil spoken of, our cares and labors made void and
frustrate' by the 'negligence of clerks and ministers;' the client 'beginneth to think evil of us that
are judges, to suspect our skill,' and to speak evil of the law." Id. (quoting in part the Lord Chief
Justice of the Common Pleas, Easter Term, 9 Eliz. 1567).
20. Id. at 490.
21.

See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2, 10 (U.S. 1776), noted in O'Malley v.

Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 284 (1939).
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Declaration of Independence is illustrative: "The history of the present
King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations,
all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny
over these States .... He has obstructed the Administration of Justice,
by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary powers. '22
The line of statutory antecedents to the current obstruction of
justice provision dates to 1831 when, following a period of political
acrimony fueled by a perceived overextension of judges' power, a
congressional act reduced the ambit of a contempt of court charge by
creating a separate criminal offense for interfering with the judicial
process. 23 This was in response to a determination that the contempt
power was too easily employed with an intent to constraining the
unilateral power of judges to declare participants in the judicial
24
process in contempt.
In the twentieth century, federal obstruction of justice
provisions expanded from a single statute to the current relatively
comprehensive scheme. Section 1503 is the wellspring from which
most of the obstruction of justice provisions, including section 1512,
arose. 25 Section 1512, originally added by the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982, was amended in 1988 to increase the scope of
witness tampering from threatening or intimidating behavior to
include acts of "corrupt persuasion." 26 While culpability for
intimidating or influencing witnesses was previously covered by
section 1503, section 1512 was apparently drafted and amended to
increase specific protection for witnesses.
Statutory analysis of sections 1503 and 1512 has created a
great deal of judicial confusion.
The current trend in statutory
interpretation is deference to the will of the legislature absent clear
textual ambiguity, in which case judicial interpretation may become
necessary. 27 In light of the past treatment and debate surrounding its
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. See Note, Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts: The Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, 82
MICH. L. REV. 90, 97-100 (1983) (The initial bifurcation of attempt and obstruction of justice
arose out of a controversy in which Judge James H. Peck was impeached for his abuse of the
contempt power and the resulting outcry over the scandal.).
24. Id. Although introduction of a criminal sanction might seem to be a dubious means of
reducing the prosecutorial power of an institution, the additions of the associated rights and
procedural safeguards of a criminal trial were intended to protect litigants. Id.
25. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 359, 380-83 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (pProviding a
detailed history of the development of federal obstruction of justice statutes including §§ 1503,
1505, and 1512).
26. Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 4, 96 Stat. 1248, 1249-50; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-690, § 7029(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4397-98; see also United States v. Kenny, 973 F.2d 339,
333-43 (4th Cir. 1992).
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structurally similar sister sections, however, a clear textual
construction of subsection 1512(c) appears impossible. 28 There are at
least two likely sources of confusion.
First, should textually overlapping statutory provisions be
applied together or do specific sections preempt omnibus sections?
Courts generally allow prosecution under both provisions in
appropriate cases. 29 For example, subsection 1512(b) proscribes
conduct that tends to interfere with witnesses and other participants
in a judicial proceeding. 30 Like section 1503, it includes a provision
relating to acts where "corrupt" or one if its linguistic derivatives
provide the applicable mental state. After the passage of the witness
tampering provisions of subsection 1512(b) in 1982, courts and
commentators struggled to determine whether the contemporaneous
removal of all references to witnesses in section 1503 evidenced
congressional intent to remove matters concerning witness tampering
from the ambit of section 1503.31 Most courts have concluded that
there was no legislative intent to make witness tampering the sole
province of section 1512.32 Indeed, sections 1503 and 1512 have been
broadly construed to proscribe actions beyond those enumerated in
their provisions. 33 Section 1512 was thought to "significantly broaden"

In any event, canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts
determine the meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should
always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and
again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in

a statute what it

says there .... When the words of a statute are

unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: "judicial inquiry is complete."
Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (citations omitted).
28. Notwithstanding this likelihood of textual confusion, the general purposes of the
obstruction sections as described by courts are simple enough to articulate: first, they are
intended to protect the judicial process by ensuring channels for effective truth-seeking; second,
they are intended to protect participants in the judicial process. See, e.g., United States v.
Cofield, 11 F.3d 413, 419 (4th Cir. 1993).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
majority of circuits had found that § 1512 "isnot the exclusive vehicle for witness tampering").
But see United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760, 761-63 (2d Cir. 1991) (reaching the opposite
conclusion).
30. See Jeffrey R. Kallstrom & Suzanne E. Roe, Obstructionof Justice, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1081, 1106-12 (2001).
31. See infra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 29.
33. See Michael E. Tigar, Crime Talk, Rights Talk, and Double-Talk: Thoughts on Reading
the Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 101, 111 n.72 (1986). But see Grace Lou
& Nancy M. Ro, Obstruction of Justice, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 929, 947-48 (1999) (observing that
courts have tended to read § 1512(b) narrowly in that they exclude acts outside of the
enumerated portions of the statute).
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the reach of section 1503, even while 1503 was being read to reach
34
outside its specifically enumerated scope.
Second, what state of mind is implied by the requirement of
"corrupt" intent?35 Traditionally, corrupt intent was thought to
mandate a specific intent to obstruct a known proceeding.3 6 Modern
readings of the statute, however, tend to diminish the stricture of that
standard, requiring only that the act in question have the reasonably
foreseeable effect of obstructing a proceeding, regardless of the
defendant's actual intent.3 7
The prosecutorial inquiry is not,
therefore, the presence of intent to obstruct the proceeding per se, but
rather the presence of intent to commit an act that could reasonably
be foreseen to have that effect.3 8 The next subsection will explore these
developments in greater detail.
1. Historical Construction of the "Corrupt" Scienter Element within
the Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes
The formative case discussing the "corrupt" scienter element of
the federal obstruction of justice statutes is United States v.
Pettibone.39 In Pettibone, the Supreme Court opined in 1893 that
"corrupt" implied more than a state of general malevolence; it required
a "specific design to thwart justice." 40 Courts applying this specific
intent standard have typically recognized that the term corrupt
implies "a higher degree of mental culpability than mere knowledge or
41
general intent."
The Pettibone definition lay largely untouched until the 1979
decision, United States v. Neiswender, where the Fourth Circuit held
34. Tigar, supranote 33, at 111 n.72.
35. Kallstrom & Roe, supra note 30, at 1089-90.
36. Id. at 1090-91.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 148 U.S. 197 (1893).
40. Id. at 206-07; Joseph V. De Marco, Note, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the
Courthouse: Mens Rea, Document Destruction,and the Federal Obstructionof Justice Statute, 67
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570, 576-77 (1992).
41. Id. at 577-79. Unsurprisingly, De Marco also posits that this is likely to be a point of
defense-the accused will claim that, despite evil designs, there was no specific intent to thwart
justice. Id. As discussed infra Part IV.C, such defenses may fail. Judicial discussion of the
transitive and intransitive meanings of the term "corruptly" is an indication that the word is
ambiguous by its very nature. The intransitive meaning of "corruptly" implies that an act was
done with a bad purpose or motive-that the accused was "wicked" or "immoral." The transitive
meaning focuses on the manner of an attempt to influence a proceeding, rather than the motive
for so doing. In essence, it depends on the act itself. In practice, as here, this key distinction has
proven difficult to articulate. Cf. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 378-79 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
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that a corrupt mental state is satisfied by "knowledge or notice" that
obstruction of justice could reasonably occur. 4 2 In Neiswender, the
defendant was accused of offering to fix a jury in return for a bribe
from a defense attorney. 43 His defense was that he had no specific
intent to fix the jury or to obstruct justice; he was merely trying to
defraud the attorney. 44 The court first noted that the "state-of-mind
requirement of [section] 1503 has long confused the courts."4 5
Specifically, the court compared twentieth-century cases that support
either the requirement of specific intent to obstruct justice or,
alternatively, the more general requirement of intent to commit an act
that would foreseeably lead to an obstruction of justice. 4 6 The
Neiswender court held that "knowledge or notice" that obstruction of
justice could reasonably occur is sufficient to support a conviction
requiring a corrupt mental state. 47 The court thereby affirmed the
conviction, reasoning that the bribery scheme might foreseeably have
prejudiced the defendant by reducing the vigor of his defense. 48
One commentator has observed that the Neiswender approach,
if taken to its logical end, would support a conviction based on a
49
standard more akin to slightly heightened criminal negligence.
There are, of course, cases that so clearly implicate a culpable mental
state that no inferential leap is required to support a conclusion of
corruption, regardless of its definition. 50 Still, difficulties arise for
cases on the penumbra of the term, where application of the scienter
requirement has proven to be both inconsistent and unpredictable. 5 1
These difficulties in prediction are underscored by the observation
that, under section 1512, "intent may, and generally must, be proven
52
circumstantially."

42. 590 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1979).
43. Id. at 1270.
44. Id. at 1272.
45. Id. at 1273.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1273-74; see also De Marco, supra note 40, at 588-89.
48. Neiswender, 590 F.2d at 1273.
49. De Marco, supra note 40F, at 571.
50. See, e.g., United States v. LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1991). Although LeQuire
was decided under the enumerated "physical force" element of § 1512(b), it represents an actthe firing of a machine gun through the wall of a prospective witness' house, killing his motherthat certainly falls on the corrupt side of the fence, regardless of the standard employed. Id.
51. See infra section III.A.
52. United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). Although
circumstantial evidence is often "no less probative than direct evidence," the existence of an
inferential leap from the factual basis of a case to the determinative issue of mental state has led
to heavy appellate litigation, particularly on the subject of whether non-coercive attempts to
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2. The Modern Nexus Approach to Construction of the "Corrupt"
Scienter Element in Section 1503
The most prominent post-Neiswender Supreme Court case
involving section 1503 crafted a "nexus" requirement for its scienter
standard: to be "corrupt" an act must only have the natural and
probable effect of interfering with an official proceeding. 53 In United
States v. Aguilar, a federal judge was convicted of both illegally
disclosing a wiretap and obstruction of justice. 54 At issue in the
obstruction of justice charge was whether his attempt to mislead a
potential grand jury witness was sufficient to support a section 1503
conviction. 55 In construing the omnibus clause of section 1503 that
prohibits "corruptly endeavoring to influence, obstruct, and impede
the... grand jury investigation," Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
court, excluded from culpability those acts that did not have the
natural and probable effect of obstructing justice.5 6 The key inquiry
was whether there was a "nexus of time, causation or logic" between
the act and the proceeding in question. 57 The Court thus affirmed the
reversal of Aguilar's jury conviction for obstruction of justice, noting
that the proof offered at trial was not within this construction of the
58
omnibus provision.
In dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for inserting
greater extratextual requirements than those traditionally required to
satisfy the rule of lenity. 59 Justice Scalia suggested both that the term
persuade a possible witness to alter their testimony qualify as corrupt. See, e.g., United States v.
Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1291 (7th Cir. 1990).
53. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598-601 (1995). Aguilar affirms, by extension,
the Neiswender line of cases, presumably including their doctrinal conflation of natural and
probable consequences of an act with the reasonably foreseeable results of that act, through its
approval of United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1990), which in turn cites
United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393-94 (11th Cir. 1984), which in turn cites
Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269. For examples of the conflation of these doctrines in practice, see
United States v. Rogers, 636 F. Supp. 237, 252-53 (D. Colo. 1986) and United States v. Mitchell,
No. R-87-0132, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16625, at *12-15 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 1988), which also
discusses extending such treatment of "corruptly" into sister provisions of Chapter 73.
54. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 595.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 598-99.
57. Id. at 599.
58. Id. at 597, 600.
59. Id. at 610-12 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Scalia criticized
the new construction of the statute on a number of pertinent grounds. First, he read the
majority's opinion as discarding the term "endeavor" and the intent required by that term. Id. at
610. Second, he noted that the specific intent jurisprudence arising from Pettibone discouraged
the majority's substitution of "natural and probable effect" for actual intent. Id. at 613. Third,
he criticized the majority for inserting a requirement that the accused know of the natural and
probable effect of his actions. Id. Justice Scalia noted that an act that had the "unnatural[ I and
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corruptly does have a long-standing definition in the context of federal
criminal law60 and that, under the majority's definition, "[a]cts
specifically intended to 'influence, obstruct or impede the due
administration of justice' . . . are necessarily 'corrupt."' 61 He further
criticized the Court for affirming a mistaken precept of Neiswender
and its progeny, opining that the "natural and probable consequence"
language arising in dicta in Pettibone and the attendant reasonably
foreseeable result test should remain an evidentiary aspect of actual
intent instead of supplanting the requirement of actual intent. 62
Both Neiswender and Pettibone couched the requirement of
reasonable foreseeability as an exclusionary element, effectively
permitting intentional acts that have only an unnatural and
improbable effect on a proceeding. 63 Neither contemplated whether
such a test may actually work in the opposite fashion by including acts
that would otherwise be excluded under a strict specific intent
requirement. 64 Furthermore, the dispute in Aguilar was both cabined
within the confines of the omnibus provision of section 1503 and
highly dependent upon the prominence given to the textual phrase
"corruptly ... endeavors." 65 As such, even if it were extremely clear,
Aguilar would not remove the inherent confusion surrounding the
application of "corruptly" as used in other portions of the federal
obstruction of justice statutes.
improbabl[e]" effect of obstructing justice would be deemed innocent, even if intent to obstruct
justice could otherwise be clearly discerned. Id. at 612. This is despite the fact that, following his
reading, the text of the statute criminalizes intent over result. See id. at 609-17; see also infra
note 204 (describing the rule of lenity).
60. Namely, Justice Scalia opines that corruptly implies "an act done with an intent to give
some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others." Aguilar, 515 U.S. at
616.
61. Id. at 617.
62. Id. at 611-12 n.2, 613; see also supra note 53 (noting that Thomas, 916 F.2d at 647, is a
lineal descendant of Neiswender).
63. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at at 599-600; Neiswender, 590 F.2d at 1273-74 ("Requiring notice
of this proscribed result focuses the constraints of the law on those sought to be deterred while
ensuring that only the culpable are punished.")
64. Compare Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599-600 ("Recent decisions of Courts of Appeals have...
tended to place metes and bounds on the very broad language of [§ 1503] .... Some courts have
phrased [these limits] as a 'nexus' requirement ....
[W]e think the 'nexus' requirement
developed in the decisions of the Courts of Appeals is a correct construction of § 1503.") with De
Marco, supra note 40, at 598-604 (presenting a hypothetical, in the context of corporate
document destruction, where the foreseeability standard developed by Neiswender and its
progeny would expand the realm of liability past specific intent and into what the author terms
criminal negligence based on a "quasi-negligence analysis").
65. See supra notes 55-58. Section 1512(c) contains a similar term-"corruptly...
attempts," which underscores the pertinence of the criticism of the Neiswender approach to
section 1503, in particular the substitution of "natural and probable consequences" for actual
intent, to the context of the new section 1512(c). See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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For example, in United States v. Farrell,66 the defendant was
convicted, under subsection 1512(b)(3), of attempting to impede a
USDA investigation by encouraging an alleged coconspirator to
withhold information from USDA agents. 67 The court determined that
the phrase "corruptly persuades" was ambiguous, then turned to
legislative history and extra-legislative sources to determine its
meaning. 68 In the limited context of a conspiracy, the Farrell court
determined that noncoercively encouraging a coconspirator to
withhold information from federal investigators may not fit within
subsection 1512(b) because
to so hold would render the statutory term
"corruptly" duplicative. 69 The government urged the court to rely on
cases interpreting section 1503 and to interpret the statute as
'
proscribing any conduct that is "motivated by an improper purpose. "70
The Third Circuit rejected that argument, reasoning that noncoercive
encouragement, without anything more, is not corrupt behavior. 71 The
holding was largely a result of the district court's finding of fact that
72
no coercion had occurred, regardless of the defendant's actual intent.
While the requirement of actual coercion was not well received by
other circuits, 73 Farrell illustrates the debate over whether section
1503 should be used to help define corruptly as it is used in its sister
74
provisions.
The use of "corruptly" as a scienter requirement within the
obstruction of justice statutes has elicited judicial struggle and made

66. 126 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1997).
67. Id. at 486.
68. Namely, they reviewed dictionary definitions of the term. Id. at 488 n.2.
69. Id. at 490.
70. Id. at 489-90.
71. Id.
72. Id. It is critical, in this context, to note that the conviction would likely have been
affirmed in the absence of the express conclusion of the trial court following a bench trial that
the defendant did not "knowingly use intimidation." Id. at 487. The trial court found that while
the defendant had encouraged his co-conspirator not to cooperate with investigators, he did not
employ coercion in so doing. Id. Reviewing the facts as presented in the Third Circuit case, it is
plain to see that they could easily support an affirmance of a jury conviction (for which no
written findings are generally provided), given the harsh words used in the apparent attempt at
non-coercive persuasion. Id. Even had a jury used precisely the same reasoning as the district
court in convicting the defendant the evidence presented would likely support affirmation on the
basis that a conclusion of actual coercion was reasonable. See id. at 485-87, 489 (defendant told
his co-conspirator that if his co-conspirator cooperated with investigators, he would be
"crucif[ied]").
73. See United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The Eleventh
Circuit ...has expressly rejected Farrell'sreasoning."); United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289,
1301 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that "corrupt" under section 1503 has long been held to require an
improper purpose); United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452-53 (2d Cir. 1996).
74. Farrell,126 F.3d at 491-92 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
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application and enforcement of its provisions unduly difficult.7 5
Unable to rely on clear precedent, multiple circuits have referenced
dictionary definitions, antiquated legislative histories, and nuances in
linguistic analysis to define the term. 76
Given the troubling
interpretive history of "corruptly" within the federal obstruction of
justice statutes, it seems implausible that the bill's drafters intended
to perpetuate this ambiguity, especially in the context of subsection
1512(c), which prescribes a punishment of up to twenty years
incarceration.
III. ACTS, MENTAL STATES AND INCONGRUITIES IN THE CURRENT
FEDERAL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE STATUTORY SCHEME
A. The Basic Obstructionof Justice Statutory Scheme: A Spider's Web
of Act and Intent
Mindful that the federal obstruction of justice statutes have
been interpreted in reference to their overall statutory scheme, this
section will delineate the various mental states required by each
section. Perhaps a sign of their importance to the fair and efficient
administration of justice, obstruction of justice statutes are one part of
a multifaceted scheme that combines both criminal and evidentiary
sanctions for their combined deterrent and punitive effect. 77 The
statutory portion of this scheme contains both a broad omnibus
provision and a number of sections that regulate conduct in discrete
circumstances. Section 1503 is the omnibus catchall provision; it
proscribes any "endeavors" to "influence, intimidate, or impede" any
jury investigation or determination. 78 It has been interpreted broadly
to "generally prohibit[] conduct that interferes with the due
79
administration of justice."
75. It should be noted that 18 U.S.C. § 1515 (2000), the obstruction of justice definitional
section, defines the term "corruptly" with respect to § 1505 only, statutorily adopting one
reasonable reading of the word and focusing on the purpose behind the act in question. See §
1515(b). The Section also defines the term "corruptly persuades." § 1515(a)(6). Nowhere does the
statute attempt to define "corrupt" or "corruptly" standing alone outside of their use in § 1505.
See § 1515.
76. See, e.g., Farrell, 126 F.3d at 488 n.2; United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 359, 379
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
77. Cf. Alycia Sykora, Comment, Forfeiture by Misconduct: Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(6), 75 OR. L. REV. 855, 869-70 (1996).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a).
79. United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1218 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v.
Bashsaw, 982 F.2d 168, 170 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 650
n.3 (11th Cir. 1990))).
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The import of the term "endeavor" as used in section 1503
signifies a standard lower than that of attempt and, while like
attempt it does not require success, it necessarily implies an element
of intent.80 Of the act requirements specified by section 1503, two
define discrete types of conduct: that which is threatening or
undertaken by force.81 The third, "to impede," implies both an act and
a mental state.8 2
This scienter requirement has been broadly
construed to include actions that are considered per se corrupt
because they tend to impede the administration of justice.8 3 Section
1504 complements section 1503's regulation of judicial proceedings,
expanding upon its proscriptions to reach written attempts to
84
influence jurors.
The remaining sections deal primarily with discrete factual
circumstances surrounding an obstruction charge. "[Section] 1505
serves a purpose in the administrative field similar to that of
[sections] 1503 and 1504 in the judicial field."85 Sections 1506 through
1509 seek to maintain the integrity of the judicial process by
protecting it from abuse.8 6 Section 1510 includes criminal penalties
for a multiplicity of acts that obstruct a federal criminal investigation.
Section 1511 expands this to include the obstruction of state or local
87
law enforcement investigations of illegal gambling businesses.
Section 1513 prohibits retaliation against a victim or witness, and
section 1514 expands this prohibition to provide civil remedies to
restrain harassment.8 8
Sections 1516 through 1519 address
obstructive acts in specific contexts, including federal audits,

80. See United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Tigar, supra
note 33, at 111 n.72 (discussing the attachment of liability pursuant to the terms "attempt" and
"endeavor").
81. § 1503(a).
82. Id.
83. See Reeves, 752 F.2d at 998-99 (discussing how courts impute corrupt intent to acts but
concluding that a taxpayer's attempt to place a false lien on the home of an Internal Revenue
agent could not fit under the ambit of "corrupt" under the statute; suggesting that the agent had
recourse through the use of civil remedies).
84.

18 U.S.C. § 1504.

85. Taran v. United States, 266 F.2d 561, 562 (8th Cir. 1959).
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 1506 (theft or alteration of records or process and false bail); 18 U.S.C. §
1507 (picketing or parading that interferes with the ability of a judge, witness, juror or court
officer to discharge their duties); 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (recording, listening to, or observing grand or
petit jury deliberations or voting); 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (obstruction of court orders).
87.

18 U.S.C. § 1511 (2000).

88.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1513 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004); 18 U.S.C. § 1514 (2000).
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examinations of financial institutions, inquiries into health carerelated offenses, and bankruptcy investigations.8 9
B. The Placement of Section 1512 within the Web: The New and Sticky
Strand
Section 1512 prohibits acts committed with the intent to
thwart the procurement of truthful evidence. Titled "[t]ampering with
a witness, victim or informant," it proscribes killing or attempting to
kill, threatening, intimidating, harassing, corruptly persuading, or
misleading such a person. 90 Subsection 1512(c)(1) is unique in that it
protects nonhuman "witnesses" by proscribing the alteration,
mutilation, destruction or concealment of a record with the intent to
impair an official proceeding. 91 Unique among the obstruction of
justice statutory scheme, subsection 1512(c)(2) also bars any "corrupt"
attempt to obstruct an official proceeding yet provides neither a
specific act requirement nor further guidance as to what constitutes
92
corrupt behavior.
1. Prior Use of Mental States in Federal Obstruction of Justice
Statutes
More importantly, subsection 1512(c), especially subsection
(c)(2), has a mental state requirement that seems to take little account
of the development of the obstruction of justice statutory scheme.
Section 1503, through the use of the phrase "corruptly endeavor,"
superimposes a level of intent. 93 Section 1504 reaches a similar
conclusion through its use of "attempt."94 Section 1505 uses both
intent to obstruct an administrative antitrust proceeding and
willfulness to keep evidence out of the adverse party's hands; its
Congressional proceeding section mirrors the scienter language of
section 1503.95 Section 1506 employs the term "feloniously," and
section 1507 uses "intent".96 Sections 1508 through 1511 employ
"knowingly and willfully," "knowingly," "willfully endeavors" and

89. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1516 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1517-1518 (2000); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1519 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
90. § 1512.
91.

§ 1512(c)(1).

92. § 1512(c)(2).
93. § 1503.
94. § 1504.
95. § 1505.

96.

§§ 1506-1507.
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"intent."97 Section 1513 uses a graded scale of intent and knowledge. 98
Section 1516 uses "intent," section 1518 uses "willfully" and section
1519 uses "knowingly."99 The witness tampering provisions of section
1512 use a mixture of knowledge and intent. 10 0 Section 1520, which
was passed contemporaneously with 1512(c) as part of Sarbanes-Oxley
and with an apparently similar purpose of supporting a factual trail of
documentation for use by governmental entities, only proscribes
knowing or willful violations of its provisions. 10 1
2. Problems that Arise from the Addition of the Corrupt Mental State
in Subsection 1512(c)
Given the comprehensive nature and structure of the
obstruction of justice statutes, it might be expected that in the wake of
Sarbanes-Oxley a clear and concise addition to the scheme would be
expected. Unfortunately, such an expectation is overly optimistic;
subsection 1512(c) is perhaps the least concise addition to the scheme.
Aside from the newly added subsection 1512(c)(2), only section 1517102
relies solely on "corruptly" to determine its mental state. 10 3 Even
subsection 1512(c)(1), passed along with subsection 1512(c)(2),
tempers its use of "corruptly" by requiring intent to impair production
of documents. 10 4 Following the principle that criminal punishment
ought to be reserved for those who are morally blameworthy, it might
be assumed that mental states that present a high bar to the
prosecutor would lead to harsher punishment. 0 5 Given that the
definition of the term "corrupt" may be construed to include

97.

§§ 1508-1511.

98. § 1513.
99. §§ 1516, 1518-1519.
100. § 1512.
101. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1520 (West Supp. 2004) creates a statutory mandate for accountants to
retain the audit records of companies issuing securities under section 10A(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 for five years, whether or not an investigation or proceeding has been
launched. In so doing, it punts the question of the specifics of its mandate to the Securities and
Exchange Commission. See § 1520(a). This is more of a preemptive mandate that creates an
independent duty, while section 1512(c) appears to have more of a reactive mandate that
punishes those who act ex post facto. It also differs from § 1512(c) in that it creates a duty
applicable to a group that is typically sophisticated and professional, and only those members of
the group who engage in activities in situations covered by a specific statutory mandate. See §§
1512(c), 1520.
102. Section 1517, however, pertains to examinations of financial institutions. § 1517.
103. Each of these statutes, however, includes within its ambit liability for an "attempt." §§
1512(c), 1517.
104. § 1512(c)(1).
105. See JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 181-83 (4th ed. 2000).
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heightened negligence, 106 would it be expected that the highest degree
of punishment-save that for trying to kill a participant in a judicial
proceeding-is to be found under section 1512(c)(2): twenty years
imprisonment? 10 7 Surely not. Imposition of such a severe punishment
by section 1512(c) may, however, in the end, provide clues for the most
logical construction: the imposition of three-part super-intent
requirement. 108
C. Ends-Based Culpability, Statutory Overlap, and the Enumerated
Acts Paradox
The proposed three-part super intent standard is tied to the
observation that the term corruptly has, in certain historical
circumstances, been construed to impose a heightened specific intent
requirement; 10 9 a requirement that exceeds the scienter requirements
found in other obstruction of justice statutes that apply to the same
acts. 110 A witness tampering charge, for example, might now be
prosecuted under section 1503 if the obstructive action has the

106. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
107. In addition to the fine allowed under each section noted, the statutorily noted terms of
imprisonment for §§ 1503-1520 are: § 1503 (excluding cases where successful killing was
involved), twenty years for either an attempted killing or a class A or B felony that involved a
petit jurorn any other case, ten years; § 1504, six months; § 1505, five years; § 1506, five years; §
1507, one year; § 1508, one year; § 1509, one year; § 1510, five years for an attempt to obstruct
the flow of information to an investigation by means of bribery, either one or five years for
various acts pertaining specifically to the financial and insurance industries; § 1511, five years; §
1512 (excluding cases where successful killing was involved), twenty years for attempted murder
or use of physical force-ten years for threat to use physical force where there was an intent
towards the realization of a specified end, or ten years when such acts are done knowingly, with
a one-year sentence for certain types of harassment; § 1513 (excluding cases where successful
killing was involved), twenty years for attempted killing and ten years for attempting to or
succeeding in causing bodily injury, damage to tangible property, or any other harmful action,
including disruption of employment; § 1516 five years; § 1517, five years; § 1518, five years; §
1519, twenty years; § 1520, 10 years. Also, in regard to § 1512, if the underlying proceeding was
criminal, the maximum penalty is the higher of the penalty stated in § 1512 or the penalty of the
underlying criminal proceeding.
108. See Steven M. Kowal, When Unexpected Government Agents Drop In: Responding to
Requests for Immediate Interviews, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 93, 106 (1999) (The author, a practicing
white collar criminal defense attorney, opines that five years of incarceration is "severe.").
109. See supra notes 39-41and accompanying text.
110. The widespread disparity in mental states throughout the obstruction of justice statutes
may be partially attributable to changing legislative attitudes. The assignment of mental states
in this statutory scheme, however, appears to have no temporal connection to its dates of
passage. For example, both subsection 1512(c), passed in 2002, and section 1517, passed in 1990,
employ "corruptly," while other sections promulgated in the intermediate period contain varying
mental states. See §§ 1512, 1517. But see, e.g., § 1518 (passed in 1996 using the term
"willfully.").
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probable effect of interfering with a proceeding.1 1 1 Alternatively, the
same act might also be prosecuted under subsection 1512(c) if there
was a specific design to thwart justice or if the demonstrated intent
was otherwise sufficiently egregious. 112 This interpretation, however,
would require a deviation, in the specific context of subsection 1512(c)
113
prosecutions, from the nexus requirement developed in Aguilar.
1. Statutory Overlap Among Obstruction Sections
The first instance of logical support for this super-intent
requirement relates to whether sections 1503 and 1512 are mutually
exclusive. 114 As previously mentioned, a question has arisen as to the
interrelationship between various provisions of the obstruction of
justice statutory scheme. Specifically, the presence of an omnibus
section lends credence to the conclusion that subsection 1512(c) was
indeed intended to be a catchall. Section 1512 was initially passed to
make up for the "inadequate" protection of victims and witnesses
under the omnibus provision of section 1503." 5 In short, Congress
deleted all references to witnesses from 1503 when 1512 was
created. 116 Nevertheless, Congress failed to otherwise clarify whether
section 1512 was intended to be the exclusive vehicle for witness
tampering charges. 1 7 Courts subsequently disagreed over whether to
allow witness tampering prosecutions under 1512 exclusively, under
both sections concurrently, or under section 1512 exclusively when one
8
of the acts enumerated in section 1512 was involved. 1
In 1988, Congress attempted to remedy this uncertainty by
amending section 1512 to "clos[e] the statutory gap" that had led to
this difference of opinion. 119 Subsequently, "the majority of circuits
hold that section 1503 is applicable in witness tampering prosecutions

111. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
112. See § 1512(c).
113. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599-600, 616; cf. De Marco, supra note 40, at 601-04 (noting
that prior to the Aguilar decision and in the context of § 1503, a requirement of specific corrupt
intent to obstruct justice is preferable to imputation of such intent using a foreseeability
analysis).
114. See Tina M. Riley, Note, Tampering With Witness Tampering: Resolving the Quandary
Surrounding 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 249, 250-51 (1999).
115. Id. at 255.
116. Id. at 257-59.
117. See P.L. No. 107-204 (2002). While other amendments to Chapter 73 of Title 18
included the addition of §§ 1519 and 1520 in full and a provision relating to witness retaliation in
§ 1513, none of these changes appear to address the question of whether § 1512(c) should be the
exclusive vehicle. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 802(a), 1107.
118. Riley, supra note 114, at 264-65.
119. Id. at 265-66, 271.
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as either an alternative to section 1512 or in addition."'120 This
approach is not without its critics. At least one commentator observes
that the minority position-that section 1512 ought to be the exclusive
vehicle for witness tampering prosecutions-is preferable to the
majority position in the interests of providing uniformity and
consistency in federal law, the appearance of fairness, actual fairness
in application of the law, and the effectuation of congressional
intent. 121 In short, in the interest of providing "a clearer and less
duplicative law," this position is preferable because it would create a
122
clean line of distinction between the competing statutes.
2. The Ends-Based Penalty Provision of Subsection 1512(c)(1)
In reference to subsection 1512(c)(1), a number of provisions
are likely to cause overlap similar to that seen in the past. For
example, the omnibus provision of section 1503 traditionally
prohibited document alteration, destruction or manipulation with
improper purpose. 23
The state of affairs since the passage of
subsection 1512(c)-that an omnibus clause and a more specific clause
overlap-directly mirrors the scenario that had developed between the
1982 addition of section 1512 and its 1988 amendment.
In comparing the culpability required by the obstruction of
justice statutes, a striking disconnect appears between the penalties
assessed for the destruction of documents and other proscribed acts.
Obstruction of justice by an attempt to destroy documents under
subsection 1512(c)(1) carries the same criminal culpability as an
attempt to kill or physically harm a witness under subsection
1512(a). 24 Assuming that society considers an attempt to kill another
person to be a more heinous and criminal act than an attempt to
mutilate or destroy a piece of paper, the logical conclusion is that this
scheme is not a means-based method of assigning culpability. Instead,
it must focus on the end result of obstruction of justice. 125

120. Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 272-73.
122. Id. at 273. (quoting 128 CONG. REC. 26,810 (1982) (statement of Senator Heinz)).
123. Eric Lent & Melinda Williams, Obstruction of Justice, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 865, 875-77
(2002).
124.18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a), 1512(c)(1) (2000).
125. The Supreme Court's focus on the natural and probable effect of an act to satisfy the
"corruptly endeavor" element of section 1503 also indicates a focus on the ends as opposed to the
means. See supra Part II.B.2.
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3. The Ends-Based Penalty Provision of Subsection 1512(c)(2)
Subsection 1512(c)(2) creates a conflict even more troubling
than that of its close neighbor because it carries a harsher penalty
than sections that specifically enumerate criminal acts. It reads,
"[w]hoever corruptly ...otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes
any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."'1 26 Considered on
its own, and given that it carries a heavier prison term that any other
attempt to obstruct justice not involving murder, subsection 1512(c)(2)
seems to render a number of provisions of the code surplusage if
interpreted in accordance with the Aguilar standard. 127 For example,
if obstruction of justice by an enumerated act carries a lesser penalty
than otherwise obstructing justice, then does obstruction by an
enumerated means constitute a defense? Further complicating the
analysis is the fact that, unlike the 1982 passage of the witness
tampering provisions of section 1512, there is little reference to other
code sections in the legislative history and no contemporaneous direct
128
amendment of preexisting obstruction of justice statutes.
One possible explanation for the disparity between the
included mental states required for a number of these offenses is that,
as legislative attitudes and mores change over time, the preferences of
The
Congress in implementing laws change in accordance.
assignment of mental states in this statutory scheme, however,
appears to have no temporal connection to the date of passage. For
example, the passage of subsection 1512(c) in 2002 and section 1517 in
126. § 1512(c)(2) (emphasis added). Read solely in conjunction with § 1512(c)(1), this section
may also be read as reading out the requirement that there be an intent to impair an object's
availability for an official proceeding. Subsection (c)(2) omits the "intent to impair" language, and
uses the term "otherwise" to differentiate its language from that of subsection (c)(1). See §
1512(c). Logically, the use of "otherwise," and the omission of the requirement of an intent to
obstruct, could lead to the conclusion that the statutory section applies regardless of intent to
impair availability. Alternative constructions of the two subsections taken together may imply
any one of the following: that they both relate to impairment of tangible evidence availability,
but with different consideration of intent to impede an official proceeding; that the former relates
to tangible evidence specifically while the latter relates to any obstructive act, regardless of an
intent to impede an official proceeding; that the former is a specific document-destruction
provision and the latter merely an attempt to restate obstruction of justice provisions found
elsewhere in Section 73; or that the "corruptly" language was intended to take on a meaning of
its own, distinguishing the provisions in subsection (c) from the other provisions of §§ 1503 and
1512. The focus of the term "otherwise," never clarified, is crucial to drawing this distinction, as
is the question of whether the "corruptly" scienter element can sufficiently be distinguished from
other forms of culpable obstruction to justify the higher punitive sanction. As discussed infra,
perhaps the best means of remedying this quandary is to read the statutory sections not in light
of one another, but in light of their relationship with the other provisions of Chapter 73.
127. See generally supra Part II.A.2.
128. See Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002); see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107.
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1990, both of which employ the term corruptly, combined with the
observation that other sections with variant mental states were
passed in the intermediate period, suggests that no significant
relationship exists between timing and the selection of a mental
state. 129 The creation of both subsection 1512(c) and section 1517 are
connected in a more normative sense: at the time of passage of each,
there was a great hue and cry about the state of the industry for which
they were intended. 13 0 The statutes are also similar in that they
appear to have been passed reactively. 131 While the express intent of
Congress in each instance was commendable and timely, in execution
it appears that Section 1512(c) will likely impose upon courts many of
132
the same struggles they have faced in the past.
As discussed above, while there are cases that could reasonably
be decided without any doubt or error, it is the cases on the penumbra
of the statute that are likely to create consternation. 133 In the next
section a sampling of possible negative effects of the newly minted
obstruction of justice statute will be further explored.
IV. "CORRUPTLY" APPLIED TO THE BUSINESS CONTEXT: FUTURE
DIFFICULTIES IN APPLICATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND PLANNING

A. Obstruction of Justice and Obstruction of Commendable Policy
Section 1512 has been applied to both criminal and civil
prosecutions. 3 4
Given the context surrounding its passage, it is

129. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1510(d) (2000) (added in 1994 using "intent"); § 1518 (passed in
1996 using "willfully"). In addition, there may be no clear answer or rationale for this scheme.
"[One would expect the common law approach to mens rea to have settled most of its significant
issues long ago. Surprisingly, however, there are important fundamental mens rea questions
that still have no clear answers." Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at
Common Law and Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 341-42 (2001).
130. See supra Part I (outlining some of the popular and governmental responses to
corporate scandals affecting the everyman shortly before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley); infra
Part V (outlining the similar reactions to the Thrift Crisis of the 1980s, which shortly preceded
the passage of § 1517).
131. See supra Part I; infra Part V.
132. For an analysis of past problems, see supra Part II.
133. The problems that an ill-defined mental state requirement present "should now be
crystal clear: Courts manipulate the definition of [mental states] to achieve the results they
desire in individual cases and across case classes." Batey, supra note 129, at 399.
134. See, e.g., United States v. LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554, 1557-59 (11th Cir. 1991) (involving
the smuggling of drugs worth over a quarter of a billion dollars, violent intimidation, and
murder); United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907, 908-10 (9th Cir. 2002) (involving a babysitter
who asked two of her clients to tell a SSA investigator that she had not been paid for her
services); United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 92-94 (2d Cir. 1997) (involving two schemes in
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reasonable to suspect that subsection 1512(c) was primarily intended
to bolster enforcement actions in a business setting.135 Its
implementation will bring new challenges to bear on the commercial
world, courts, and enforcement agencies partially because "the
elements of several white collar offenses, including obstruction...
frequently fail to distinguish between criminal and legitimate
conduct."'136 Inequitable application of the law may also occur due to
the immense discretion given to enforcement agencies both in their
formal and informal capacities. 137 In short, while subsection 1512(c)
was based on commendable policy goals, there will be significant
functional impediments to its successful implementation unless a
novel interpretive scheme is developed.
B. Parsingthe Difficult Line Between Legitimate Practiceand Illegal
Activity
Returning to section 1512(c), it is apparent that the content of
the subsection will be difficult to apply in the business context. The
use of documentation and the preservation of internal records are
critical in investigating allegations of illegal business practice. 138 The
importance of this paper trail in an investigation is illustrated by a
complaint based upon document destruction filed in the federal
antitrust litigation involving Rambus Incorporated (Rambus). 139 In an
administrative hearing, the Federal Trade Commission complaint
counsel moved for a default judgment against Rambus in the antitrust
140
case as a sanction for bad-faith document destruction.
At issue in this ongoing determination is whether Rambus'
destruction of relevant documents was a bad-faith attempt to skirt
predicted litigation or whether it was part of an established and
innocent, if misguided, document retention and destruction
regimen.' 4 ' Although the issue in Rambus was primarily evidentiary
which attempts were made to conceal the fact that substandard repairs were made on
commercial jet aircraft engines).
135. See supra Part I.
136. James F. Ponsoldt & Stephen Marsh, Entrapment When the Spoken Word Is the Crime,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1202 (2000).
137. See infra Part IV.C.-D.
138. See infra notes 145-47.
139. See Counsel's Motion for Default Judgment Relating to Respondent Rambus, Inc.'s
Willful, Bad-Faith Destruction of Material Evidence at 1, In re Rambus, Inc. (No. 9302) (Dec. 20,
2003) (Some portions of the document have been excised in the public version but the relevant
issues are still reasonably clear.) http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/O30116scanpubversionccmot
dejudg.pdf.
140. Id. at 108.
141. Id. at 3-5.
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in nature, the case illustrates both the importance of corporate
documentation as an evidentiary tool in all types of proceedings
(administrative, civil, or criminal) and the intersection between
legitimate and criminal conduct.' 42 Complaint counsel's contention of
bad-faith destruction relied heavily upon statements made by Rambus
employees, both those directly linking document destruction to
anticipated litigation, 143 as well as statements requiring an inferential
leap between that which was stated and a nefarious intent. 144 The
decision whether to retain or destroy documents is omnipresent in the
business world and may require balancing a number of competing
interests.
Internal corporate document retention policies allow companies some leeway in
destroying documents. Courts have recognized that organizations, due to high storage
and organization costs, cannot be expected to keep documents forever. Most times, these
records may be destroyed as long as they are not relevant to some ongoing or foreseeable
litigation ...[Professor Solum and Marzen] argued destruction of evidence undermined
two important goals of the judicial system-truth and fairness ...Thus, prohibitions on
the destruction of5evidence punish, deter, compensate and restore accuracy to the fact14
finding process.

The preservation of internal records becomes critical during an
investigation of alleged illegal business practice. Probative of this is
the placement of subsection 1512(c)'s document-destruction provision
within the "Tampering with a Witness" section. 146 The corporate paper
trail may often become an important witness when complex criminal
acts are alleged.
Document retention determinations are often informed by
legitimate cost concerns. While the cost of retaining documents
pertaining to an ongoing or foreseeable dispute may be minimal, "legal
control on the destruction of evidence may be wasteful and inefficient
... [and] may impose great financial costs and recordkeeping
burdens.' 147 A routine cost-based document destruction policy may
provoke less suspicion than one that is performed "informally or on an
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., id. at 3, 46 (recounting direct admissions in depositions by Rambus employees
that the intention behind their document destruction policy was to prevent the use of such
documents in future litigation).
144. See, e.g., id. at 65 ("[W]e can infer from [a Rambus employee's email]-in which he jokes
about documents 'falling victim to the document retention policy :-)' that ... important...
documents ... were destroyed." (italics added and emoticon in original)); id. at 55 ("The existence
of [untruthful] testimony invites inferences of deliberate wrongdoing and bad-faith ...
(emphasis added)).
145. Matthew J. Bester, A Wreck on the Info-Bahn: Electronic Mail and the Destruction of
Evidence, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 75, 79-80 (1998).

146. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000).
147. See Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the
Destructionof Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1140-41 (1987).

2004]

CORRUPTION OFA TERM

1453

as-needed basis." 148 Selective retention may also be costly due to
difficulties associated with identifying and culling the appropriate
documents. 149 Furthermore, as businesses increasingly accept
electronic messaging as a preferred communication mechanism,
document destruction has become largely automatic, raising new
150
issues of mental state and foreseeability.
There may also be ancillary benefits and hindrances created by
the imposition of restrictions on document destruction. 15 1
The
economic model of document destruction recognizes that a regime that
has the positive benefit of "chilling the creation of documents
evidencing unlawful activity ... directly increas[ing] the cost of
lawbreaking itself,"'152 may, at the same time, have the negative effect
of "chilling the production of useful documentary evidence," which
may result in inefficient and unsafe decisions. 53 While with twentytwenty hindsight it is apparent that the costs of unregulated
document destruction can be extraordinarily high, the costs of
document retention also may exact a price by presenting managers
154
with this Hobson's choice.
For example, one commentator reported that the New York
Times installed a program on its computers that automatically deletes
email after thirty days. 55 Given that an errant keystroke might be
sufficient to impute intent to obstruct justice, 56 the implications of
this practice for any organization that frequently finds itself involved
in litigation are significant. 157 If litigation is to be anticipated as a
regular aspect of doing business, automatic destruction opens the
company up to liability. Conversely, a regular destruction regime
148. Bester, supranote 145, at 84-85.
149. Solum & Marzen, supranote 147, at 1140-41.
150. Bester, supra note 145, at 86-87 ("[C]ourts should not leap to conclusions based on
traditional document destruction.... Intent is much more difficult to measure when a user hits
the enter button by mistake and destroys the last copy of an email message .... [N]early every
computer user has inadvertently hit the wrong key and supplied the computer with an
unintended command ....[In such an instance] under the Neiswender approach it appears that
courts may impute intent."); see also supra note 5 (noting that Arthur Andersen's conviction in
the Enron obstruction case involved the destruction of both tangible and electronic information).
151. Solum & Marzen, supra note 147, at 1141.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Bester, supra note 145, at 87 n.184.
156. Id. at 87.
157. See id. A Lexis search using the operator "NAME (New York Times)" for the ten-year
period ending on January 20, 2003, returned 175 hits, exclusive of unpublished cases. While
there were a number of cases that appeared multiple times in the list, and some returns pointed
to organizations such as the New York Times Employees Federal Credit Union, it is still safe to
say that The New York Times is not infrequently involved in litigation.
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might shield an otherwise culpable party from liability. 158 The choice
thus presented to managers exacerbates the potential for abuses of the
obstruction of justice statutes through selective prosecution based on
15 9
inferential evidence.
An additional problem is that those with a motive to destroy
evidence have a litany of methods available to circumvent the
strictures of the law. 160 Given that "permissibility of destruction
arguably turns on the intent of the destroyer ... [and] proof of a
party's subjective motivation is difficult," creative methods of avoiding
obstruction of justice are available. 161 This is another negative effect of
a broad and ill-defined criminal obstruction rule. Although
documentary evidence may be necessary in the discovery and
prosecution of corporate corruption, the regime currently in place may
prove to be both over-inclusive by potentially criminalizing a business
necessity with only the benefit of an ex post inquiry into intent, and
under-inclusive by allowing a claim of regular business activity to
shield a malicious act. These observations underscore the restraint
that will be necessary in construction of the current scienter element
of subsection 1512(c) due to its propensity, absent such restraint, to
limit useful activity.
C. Problems of Prosecutorialand JudicialDiscretion
There will likely be significant problems in adapting corporate
practice and government enforcement strategies to the requirements
of subsection 1512(c). Given the strict penalties imposed by subsection
1512(c), and the prevalence of routine document destruction,
legislative clarification of "corruption" is needed to prevent
unpredictable interpretation and selective application by the judicial
system.162 The ambiguous nature of the statutory language presents
158. Bester notes that a routine document retention policy may invoke less suspicion than
one that is performed "informally or on an as-needed basis." Id. at 84-85.
159. Compare Frank 0. Bowman, III & Stephen L. Sepinuck, "High Crimes and
Misdemeanors" Defining the Constitutional Limits on PresidentialImpeachment, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1517, 1556-57 (1999) (noting that, on average, each U.S. Attorneys' office handles an
obstruction of justice or perjury prosecution arising out of a civil cases where the United States
or an agency thereof was not a party about once every half-century, and then usually only when
there is a strong federal interest), with Atlas, supra note 6, at C1 (noting the modern ascendance
of obstruction charges as a prosecutorial tool).
160. Solum & Marzen, supra note 147, at 1142.
161. Id.
162. See 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b)(6) (2000) (defining the mental state element of § 1505). See
generally United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In Poindexter, after
the court struck down the mental state requirement of Section 1503 as unconstitutional due to
vagueness, Congress clarified the scienter element to revive the statute.
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two dangers. First, an interpretation focusing solely on the unclear
words of the statute could trump whatever legislative intent spurred
its passage. 163 Second, judicial interpretation of ambiguous text
creates the danger that the intent of some legislators will be
prioritized over others, thereby prejudicing the judicial process and
164
discouraging future legislation.
There are substantial arguments against the placement of this
type of statutory regime into the hands of individual actors in the
judicial system. Attorney General and later Supreme Court Justice
Robert H. Jackson observed that:
One of the greatest difficulties of the position of prosecutor is that he must pick his
cases, because no prosecutor can even investigate all of the cases in which he receives
complaints.
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his case, it follows that he can choose his
defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he will pick
people that he thinks he should get, rather than cases that need to be prosecuted. With
the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance
of finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone. In such
a case, it is not a question of discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for
the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then
searching
16 5
the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on him.

While selective prosecution is not unique to obstruction of
justice, the inferential nature of many obstruction of justice
accusations invites abuse. 166 Although the statutory obstruction of
justice regime was established and has been developed partially to
provide the accused with a modicum of protection from zealotry, 167 it is
necessary to recognize the potential for the degradation of such

163. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative
History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation,151 U. PA. L. REV.
1417, 1525-26 (2003).
164. See id.
165. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727-28 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Attorney
General Robert H. Jackson, Address Delivered at the Second Annual Conference of United States
Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940)).
166. Because criminal obstruction charges rarely arise from civil suits and because when
they do they generally are only brought when a strong federal interest is present in a case
(despite the fact that obstruction charges can be brought pursuant to criminal and civil cases),
the argument that prosecutors use their discretion when bringing obstruction charges is
particularly strong. See Bowman & Sepinuck, supra note 159, at 1556-57. Even assuming an
intention by courts and prosecutors to apply the law evenly and equitably, then-Justice Jackson
made a complementary observation in another context, noting that "[flair prosecutors and
conscientious judges sometimes are misinformed or draw inferences from conflicting evidence
with which we would not agree"; adding shortly thereafter that "even an erroneous judgment,
based on a scrupulous and diligent search for truth, may be due process of law." Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (emphasis added).
167. See supra Part II.A.
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protections. 168
First, "[j]udicial usurpation of the legislature's
prerogative to define crimes seriously undermines the principle of
legality, our societal commitment to prospective legislative definition
of criminal offenses.' 6 9
The importance of this principle is
underscored by the fact that a criminal acquittal is rarely, if ever, the
170
same as never having been charged in the first place.
Second, vagueness of a statute may place "unfettered
discretion... in the hands of the ... police."' 71 Finally, once they
have attained a large degree of discretionary power, enforcement
agencies also have the benefit of informal enforcement actions that
exist outside of the strictures of statute. 172 Ultimately, the risks of
judicial discretion associated with an ambiguous statute must be
borne out by the general public.
D. Social and Other Extralegal Consequences for Prosecuted
Individuals and Businesses
The ramifications of the ambiguity found in 1512(c) may
manifest not only directly through the judicial system and prescribed
penalties, but also through extralegal social effects. These social
effects take two forms that are particularly pronounced with regard to
obstruction of justice: the effects of an indictment or investigation; and
the effects of prosecution or sanction may allow for undue official
pressure, whether or not the underlying charges would have
eventually been substantiated. It is not advisable to allow social
interest and pressures to select the boundaries of whether an actor is
subject to prosecution under a particular criminal statute. In the
words of Justice Cardozo:
We are not unmindful of the public interests, of the insistent hope and need that the
ways of bribers and corruptionists shall be exposed to an indignant world. Commanding
as those interests are, they do not supply us with a license to palter with the truth or to
twist what has been written in the statutes into something else that we should like to
see. Historic liberties and privileges are not to bend from day to day "because of some
accident of immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts
73
the judgment." 1

While vigilance against a break from the strictures of the law is
commendable, such vigilance can be a double-edged sword. Justice
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
193 U.S.

See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
Batey, supra note 129, at 342.
See infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168 (1972).
See infra Part IV.D.
Doyle v. Hofstader, 177 N.E. 489, 498 (N.Y. 1931) (quoting N. Sec. Co. v. United States,
197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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Cardozo's words, written in regards to a case where the actual
construction of the statute was beneficial to the defendant, are no less
important where the construction may work against the defendant. 174
In the case of health-care fraud, an aspect of the criminal law
specifically dealt with in the obstruction of justice statutes, one
commentator warned: "[n]o one could dispute that hardship or not,
fraudulent institutions should be ... relentlessly prosecuted.
However, the... costs of such investigations are high, and care should
be taken so that the mystique of the ... law enforcement machine
does not seduce the regulator into becoming a hunter when there is no
prey." 175 The chance of such seduction may be heightened by exigent
social interests, such as when the public demands accountability from
those charged with enforcement.
A criminal proceeding may impose costs upon the defendant
regardless of an eventual acquittal. 176 One commentator described the
interaction between a criminal acquittal and the socially normative
view of innocence in the following manner: "[o]ne barrier to acquitted
defendants achieving vindication is that the presumption of innocence
is a legal requirement, not a social norm.. . we strongly suspect many
defendants who are acquitted are in fact guilty.., leaving the
innocent defendant with no ability to persuade others that his case
177
was different."
Transposition of this observation on a business environment as
opposed to a "standard" criminal environment may magnify the gap
between socially normative and legally conclusive behavior. The
social effects of accusation upon the innocent live as substantial
burdens because "the sequella of an indictment may leave the
defendant's reputation, personal relationships, and ability to earn a
living so badly damaged that he may never be able to return to the life
1 78
he knew before."
Obstruction of justice may be particularly susceptible to
assumptions based upon social belief as opposed to proven fact. An
example is the spoliation doctrine, which applies when it is alleged
that relevant evidence was intentionally destroyed or otherwise made
174. See supra note 64 for the debate over whether modern interpretations of statutes
involving a "corruptly" scienter element are in fact defendant friendly.
175. Pamela H. Bucy, The Path from Regulator to Hunter: The Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion in the Investigation of Physicians at Teaching Hospitals, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 3, 50
(2000).
176. See generally Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94
Nw. U. L. REV. 1297 (2000) (discussing some extralegal consequences for the defendant in a
criminal proceeding).
177. Id. at 1299-1300.
178. Id. at 1299.
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unavailable by a party in a legal dispute. 179 The spoliation principle
"infers from the fact that evidence was destroyed that the spoliator
was conscious of her guilt."' 80
This inference also leads to the
presumption that the spoliator was guilty of the full litany of mental
states and actions that could possibly underlie the alleged unlawful
act. 1 1 By extension, the social and legal conceptualizations of
obstruction of justice may implicate an innocent defendant in both the
alleged obstructive act as well as in the subject matter of the original
proceeding or investigation. 8 2 The traditional spoliation inference has
been attacked on the ground that even an innocent litigant may
destroy evidence that she feels is misleading and would wrongly
implicate her. 8 3 In defense of the inference is the principle of
"'courtroom truth' [where] a correct verdict.., results from a fair
process.' 1 84 Under this notion, even production of misleading
documents is necessary because the purpose of a trial is to parse what
is true from what the litigant might presume to be misleading18 5 This
debate illustrates the somewhat independent natures of legal
conclusions from a criminal conviction and social sanctions that arise
from the destruction of evidence.
This doctrine mirrors one of the underlying principles that
provide the basis for the very existence of obstruction of justice as a
86
crime-the preservation of a full and complete documentary trail
Moreover, both the spoliation doctrine and the obstruction of justice
regime are indicative of a social reality in which a popular inference of
guilt may be forged from an investigation, indictment or acquittal.
Obstruction of justice is often a criminal charge built largely upon
inference. 8 7 The combination of a social inference of guilt from
investigation or indictment and the heightened inferential basis for
179. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1409 (7th ed. 1999).
180. Solum & Marzen, supra note 147, at 1160. Solum and Marzen describe the words of
Learned Hand as the "classic statement" on the spoliation principle: "[w]hen a party is once
found to be fabricating or suppressing documents, the natural, indeed, the inevitable conclusion
is that he has something to conceal, and is conscious of guilt." Id. at 1161 (emphasis added).
181. See id. at 1160-61.
182. Even the statutory text seems to reflect this idea:
"If the offense under this section [1512] occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal
case, the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall
be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have
been imposed for any offense charged in such case."
§ 1512(j).
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Solum & Marzen, supra note 147, at 1161.
Id. at 1162.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
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guilt where a charge of destruction of evidence is involved creates a
circumstance where the danger of unfounded social stigma is
particularly strong.
The inference, conjecture, and social stigma that are associated
with obstruction of justice charges in the business setting may be
exploited without resort to any formal proceeding or sanction through
regulatory arm-twisting. During this process, an enforcement agency
pursues an entity, not through established channels of administrative
procedure or legal action, but by a "threat... to impose a sanction or
withhold a benefit in hopes of encouraging 'voluntary' compliance with
a request that the agency could not impose directly on a[n]...
entity. 18s8 Essentially, arm-twisting is a means of evading substantive
limitations on an agency's regulatory power where compliance is
sometimes procured through the threat of either a release of adverse
publicity or resort to the official sanctioning process.18 9
The
inferential and socially costly nature of an obstruction indictment may
make it particularly susceptible to such arm-twisting.
V. SOLUTION: LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION OR JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION
The obvious and presumably most effective way to remedy the
inadequacies of subsection 1512(c) is congressional inclusion of a welldefined scienter element. As a model, Congress may look to federal
banking laws, which were passed under circumstances similar to
those under which Sarbanes-Oxley came to exist. Alternatively,
Congress could reference the text of the Model Penal Code (MPC) for
the purpose of clarifying the mental state requirement of subsection
1512(c). This Part both discusses these changes and suggests a
judicial reading of subsection 1512(c) that would better comport with
its placement in the statutory scheme, allow for more effective
document retention planning, and better effectuate the purposes for
which it was passed.
A. Optimal Solution: Banking Law as a Model for Revising Subsection
1512(c)
One template for revision is the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), which imposes
criminal sanctions for misdeeds in the banking sector. Both Acts were
188. Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of CongressionalDelegations of
Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 874.
189. Id. at 874-76.
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promulgated in reaction to social outcry over major corporate
scandals. 190
In the late 1980s, a rash of thrift failures bankrupted the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Fund. 191 The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency determined that poor management,
specifically insider abuse, fraud, and misconduct, played a significant
role in the wave of failures that came to be known as the Thrift
Crisis. 192 To protect the unwitting public and restore confidence in the
banking industry, Congress passed FIRREA, which "dramatically
strengthened ... [the government's] enforcement tools" necessary to
regulate the banking industry. 193 President George H.W. Bush stated
that "[b]eginning today ...criminal penalties will be toughened from
yesterday's slap on the wrist to the clang of a prison door ...[tjhose
who try to loot the savings of their fellow citizens deserve, and will
' 94
receive, swift punishment."'
FIRREA was significant in that: (1) it set a clear and
standardized scienter requirement for criminal liability; (2) it
acknowledged the business reality that certain individuals are better
situated to gauge the illegality of a course of action; and (3) most
importantly, by instituting a graded scale for the scienter required for
prosecution, it expressly differentiated between persons who had
substantial versus casual participation in the illegal conduct. 195 In
essence, FIRREA protected banking institutions and the general
public, while shielding innocent employees from the threat of criminal
liability.196
Applying the textual logic of FIRREA to subsection 1512(c)
would allow greater criminal culpability for true obstruction of justice,
while recognizing that statutes should consider the context in which
they will be enforced. 197
First, importing FIRREA's scienter

190. See JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 20-22, 661-63 (3d ed.

2001); supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
191. Id. at 20-22, 661-63.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 661-63
194. Id. at 662 (quoting 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1072).
195. Id.
196. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4) (2000). Pursuant to the graded scale of culpability, bank directors
and officers are held to a more stringent standard, while independent contractors, defined as
attorneys, accountants, and appraisers, must have acted knowingly or recklessly to be held
criminally liable.
197. See supra Part I. The recent corporate scandals generally mirror those in the banking
industry around the time FIRREA was passed, suggesting that an importation of the statutory
scheme might be in order. Wholesale importation of this provision, however, may prove to be
problematic because one of its provisions dealing with obstruction of an examination of a
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requirement into subsection 1512(c) would clarify and standardize its
culpable mental state, thereby providing greater guidance for
enforcement efforts. 198 This clarification would also better enable
business professionals to conform their behavior to the standards of
the law. Second, the proposed revision would accurately reflect
business practices by assigning liability only to those individuals
having a high level of knowledge about and direct responsibility for
internal governance policies, including document destruction.
Adopting a liability structure similar to that of FIRREA would allow
for graded culpability, with inner-circle participants held to a higher
standard than individuals playing only a tangential role in the
obstructive conduct. Third, a FIRREA-based revision would reduce
the potential for subsection1512(c) to be used as a catchall by defining
the relationships and circumstances under which the law applies.
B. Default Solution:Adoption of a Model Penal Code-Based Mental
State Requirement
If nothing else, Congress ought to amend subsection 1512(c) to
express a clearly defined state of mind requirement. Such revision
would provide guidance for courts and enforcement agencies in the
effective discharge of their official duties. An ancillary benefit will
accrue to defendants in that they will be put on better notice of what
is statutorily required of them as they develop plans for internal
monitoring, make decisions on document retention or destruction, or
make daily choices as to how to manage their professional affairs.
The insertion of a specific intent standard could track the
graded intent provisions of the MPC, an academic effort that has
gained increased acceptance in a number of states in terms of both
adoption and influence on reform. 199 An application of MPC-based
principles would serve to clarify the mental state requirement because
it both defines its mental state terms and simplifies differentiation
between terms used for its mental states. 20 0 The primary lesson to be
taken away from the MPC is that it may be relatively easy to clearly
define a mental state.
In examining the sister statutes present in Chapter 73, there
are a number of provisions that, if emulated, would also allow for a
financial institution by its regulatory agency, also uses the ambiguous term "corruptly." See 18
U.S.C. § 1517.

198. This Note makes no attempt to gauge or comment upon the efficacy of FIRREA in
practice. Instead, it embraces the nuanced structure of its mental state requirement.
199. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Draft 1985); KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 105, at 12.
200. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Draft 1985).
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clearer interpretation of subsectionl512(c). First, section 1515 is a
definitional section. 2 01 Where better to succinctly define "corruptly"
than in a definitional section that already contains a definition for the
20 2
term "corruptly persuades" in relation to a similar code section?
Provisions similar in substance to this suggestion are not
unknown in the federal criminal code. Of course, this type of an
amendment might alter the standard for criminal culpability, but
careful drafting could easily cure such concerns. 20 3 The relative
gravity of the mental state requirement is not so much the issue as
there being any clearly defined mental state. The use of an MPCbased approach, or one imported from another area of substantive law,
should meet the independently justifiable ends of clarity and certainty
in the federal criminal code.
C. Intermediate Solution: JudicialImposition of a Three-PartSuper
Intent Requirement
Unless or until subsection 1512(c) is amended, judicial
interpretation of the term corruptly will be necessary. In order to
accurately reflect its place in the statutory scheme, subsection 1512(c)
offense should require: (1) knowledge of the predicate possibly illegal
act; (2) knowledge of a proceeding or investigation in connection with
that act; and (3) the specific intent to commit an additional act with
the express or manifestly clear purpose of obstructing justice. 204
201. 18 U.S.C. § 1515.
202. See 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b)(6). But see United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907, 911 (9th
Cir. 2002) (deriding that definition as "circuitous ... and unhelpful").
203. In examining the base-level scienter requirement in the current form of § 1512(c), it is
apparent that the scienter level could be held as high as purpose, if it is interpreted in light of
the definition in § 1515(b)(6) or as low as negligence, should a court desire. See De Marco, supra
note 40, at 598-604. Still, even if the interpretation were based on § 1515(b)(6), the phrase
"acting with an improper purpose" should hardly be held up as a scion of legislative clarity. §
1515(b)(6).
204. In the event that a judge or prosecutor is faced with a situation that reflects the
problematic nature of §1512(c), a judicial interpretation may be in order. Whatever the course of
conduct, a judge ought not to live up to this tradition, as expressed by Professor Batey: "Old
habits are hard to break, and one of the most deeply engrained habits in the American judiciary
is a propensity to treat the mental requirement for a particular crime as merely a suggestion,
which is subject to change if judges think they have a better idea." Batey, supra note 129, at
414; see also Ponsoldt & Marsh, supra note 136, at 1242-43. As a means of combating this habit
in the face of an ambiguous statute, the statute should be strictly construed as a nod to the rule
of lenity. The rule of lenity prescribes that statutory ambiguity in a criminal case be resolved in
favor of the defendant. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1332-33 (7th ed. 1999).It has been used in
cases involving the term "corruptly" directly in response to the ambiguous nature of the term. In
at least one of these contexts there has been disagreement concerning its use. See United States
v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 489 (3d Cir. 1997). But see Khatami, 280 F.3d at 913. This Note argues
in favor of the former due to both the ambiguity in the statutory text and the potential for
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Setting aside prior judicial interpretation of the meaning of
"corruptly" in its sister statutes, a close reading of subsection 1512(c)
indicates that, as used therein, the term logically implies this threepart super-intent requirement. Under this reading, subsection 1512(c)
would encompass all obstructive acts so long as the prosecutor can
satisfy this heightened mental state requirement.
Essentially,
subsection 1512(c) could be deemed to proscribe all acts that tend to
obstruct justice; however, its "corruptly" intent provision coupled with
its heightened sanction suggests that more than mere reasonable
foreseeability should be required for liability.20 5 Moreover, this
construction does not require deviation from either the application of a
nexus requirement or the reasonable foreseeability standard that
20 6
controls construction of its sister statutes.
Reading a super-intent requirement into subsection 1512(c)
would resolve two important problems with the current statutory
structure.
First, it would eliminate the problem of ends-based
culpability premised solely on reasonable foreseeability of justice
being obstructed. Requiring super-intent would most likely allow
application of the section's harsh penalty to attempts to impede justice
when particularly egregious motives or premeditation are clear. At the
same time, heightening the scienter requirement in subsection 1512(c)
would not prevent its lower penalty sister provisions from policing
obstructive actions that are committed with relatively less intent to
impede justice, thereby imputing a system of graded intent within the
statutory scheme. Graded liability would have little impact on the
prosecution of relatively innocent obstructive acts, while accurately
reflecting the legislative ire that was aimed primarily at egregious
207
offenses.
dangerous application. See supra Parts III, IV. Literally, however, the language of the statute
intones that the word "corruptly" implies a form of super-intent.
205. Under such an approach, Section 1512(c)(1) would apply specifically to instances where
tangible evidence was at issue, with Section 1512(c)(2) applying in all other circumstances due to
a broad reading of the word "otherwise." See § 1512(c).
206. This would also mark something of a return to the Pettibone standard, where both

knowledge of a proceeding and the specific intent to obstruct or impede justice were required.
While the term "natural and probable consequence" also arose from Pettibone, its treatment in
that case was primarily an evidentiary standard. See Pettibone, 148 U.S. 197, 206-07, 209-10
(1893). Additionally, it would avoid the importation of doctrines such as natural and probable
consequences and reasonable foreseeability from Section 1503 cases, avoiding the types of
doctrinal difficulties identified by Justice Scalia in United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 611-12
(1995), from that section's use of "endeavor" to the use of "attempt" in Section 15 12(c) and would
dovetail with the mention of "attempt" in Section 1512(c).
207. See supra notes 5-6. Such a definition would also be consonant with Justice Scalia's
definition of the term "corruptly"--"an act done with an intent to give some advantage
inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others"-so long as avoidance of possible civil or
criminal liability is considered an advantage. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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Second, imposing a three-part super-intent requirement would
avoid prosecution under multiple statutes since the graded culpability
scale would allow prosecution in the alternative but only a single
conviction for each relevant act. This would further simplify the task
of distinguishing between legitimate business practice and illegal
activity.
Moreover, subsection 1512(c) could not be judged to
criminalize previously innocent behavior; instead, it would simply
increase the sanctions available for behavior that previously could
have been deemed illegal based on intent.
VI. CONCLUSION

While 18 U.S.C. 1512(c) was part of an appropriate collective
response to exigent social ills, close examination of its terms reveals a
potential for abuse. Moreover, due to ambiguous language and loose
construction of similar provisions of the federal criminal code, it
exhibits a particular propensity towards both direct abuse and
inefficient and costly indirect effects. Strict construction of its mental
state element-a three part super-intent requirement-would cure
some of the potential ills of the statute by focusing its ambit on
particularly egregious behavior instead of behavior that closely
resembles legitimate activity. Such a construction would also comport
with its placement within the obstruction of justice statutory scheme
by embracing a graded scale of intent and culpability. Alternatively,

amendment of the statute for the purpose of either simple clarity or
development of a statutory graded intent scheme is preferable to the
current state of affairs.
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